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SPECIAL ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION AT SEA
Brunson MacChesney
It is superfluous before a naval
audience to emphasize the significance
of the law of the sea. Certainly the
developments on the continental shelf,
fisheries, base lines, and the breadth
of the territorial sea in recent years
have been of tremendous importance.
The 1956 Final Report of the International Law Commission on the Law
of the Sea in Time of Peace, to
which several of my colleagues have
already referred, is the latest statement on that subject and the Report
is of great interest to our Government
and Navy in the United States and to
other navies and countries.
There have been many recent incidents, involving various aspects of conflict arising out of these developments,
which will illustrate the kind of problems that are involved. There has already been some reference to the
seizure some years ago by Peru of four
or five whaling ships of Panamanian
registry off the coast of Peru. This
seizure enabled Peru to assess a judicial
fine of 3 million dollars, which was paid
to release the vessels from seizure,
which Peru asserted was within their
claimed 200-mile zone. In fact, some of
the boats were seized under the doctrine
of "hot pursuit" more than 200 miles
out from the coast.
Off the coast of Ecuador, two American·registered merchant vessels were
stopped and seized, with one American

seaman being injured by gunfire. A fine
of $49,000 was imposed. Moreover, in a
subsequent conference between Ecuador and the United States, Ecuador
took the position that the privilege of
innocent passage did not extend to
fishing vessels. Numerous incidents involving the seizure by Mexico of American vessels fishing for shrimp in disputed waters have also been reported.
There have been other instances in
many other areas. For example, Norway
and the Soviet Union have been involved in controversy. Norway has
seized various Soviet fishing boats inside
her claimed limits and has fined them
$88,000 in one case this year, which is
the largest single fine in Norwegian
court history for this offense. Moreover,
Sweden and Denmark are involved in a
dispute with the Soviet Union over
territorial water limits in the Baltic.
As many of you know, there have
been frequent incidents in which J apanese fishing vessels have been seized by
Korea, Communist China, Nationalist
China and Russia. Since Japan, like
Iceland, is largely dependent upon its
fisheries, this has raised a very serious
problem for that country. The U.S.S.R.,
in addition, established unilaterally a
conservation zone, which accentuated
the difficulties. The two countries have
subsequently changed this situation
somewhat by temporary arrangements
pending the conclusion of a peace
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treaty, which has now been signed.
When it goes into effect, a long-range
fishing agreement will also become
effective. Furthermore, Australia and
Japan are involved in a dispute over
pearl fisheries off the coast of Australia,
which may be submitted to the International Court of Justice for settlement.
There have been many other significant developments which I will not be
able to go into this morning. There is
the growth of the continental shelf
doctrine; there is the question of the
status of radar ships and oil platforms
off a coast; there is the use of testing
areas, such as the hydrogen bomb area,
and the proving grounds, which I will
discuss later, for testing guided missiles
and high-flying interception; there is the
establishment of air defense identification zones by the United States and
Canada; and, finally, there is the problem of legal control of outer space.
The main emphasis of my talk will be
upon the problems of the breadth of the
territorial sea and the measurement
thereof. This is not the occasion to
discuss .the historical origin of the doc-

trine of the freedom of the seas and its
general acceptance in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. But one contrast
with that period which Mr. Phleger, the
legal advisor of the State Department,
has pointed out is that in those days it
was the large, powerful maritime states
that tried to close off the high seas.
Today, it tends to be rather the smaller
coastal states that are making such
claims.
In order to make this subject more
concrete, I am employing visual aids.
With the exception of Latin America
(for which no adequate slide was available), all the other major areas will be
shown in the course of the discussion.
(See Chart I)
This chart, which has been used in
previous years at the Naval War College,
indicates some of the zones that are
claimed by states for various purposes:
1. The territorial limit of three
miles;
2. The inland waters (bays, harbors,
and rivers);
3. The customs enforcement zone;
4. The extent of the Pacific ADIZ;
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5. The liquor treaty zone in the 20's;
and
6. Special customs waters, and so
on.
By and large, the high seas are
divided into: (1) internal waters; gencrally speaking, the territorial states
claim full sovereignty over these waters,
subject, for example, to certain customary rules in ports; (2) the territorial
waters; there is also a claim to sovereignty here, but this claim is subject to
various customary rules of international
law, such as the right of innocent
passage, entry in distress, et cetera; (3)
the contiguous zones; there are for this
area special claims for specific purposes,
including defense; and (4) the high seas;
these are free to all, but they are subject
to exceptional claims to suppress piracy,
self-defense and hot pursuit.
Discussion of territorial waters in the
past has frequently not distinguished
very closely between the problem of
how the territorial sea is measured and
the extent of it. The Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case in the World Court made
this differentiation extremely clear, and
I will come to that in a moment. First, a
question of measurement-the location
of the base lines, which divide the
internal waters from the territorial
waters, and serve as the base-point for
measuring from land. There is a general
agreement that the low-water mark, as
against the high-water mark, should be
used where land is the measuring point.
What points on the land and on islands
and rocks that should be used as a base
has, however, been the subject of vigorous controversy. There is the so-called
"coast line rule," defended by the
United Kingdom and other maritime
powers, and the so-called "straight line
system" and the "headland theory,"
which other states have employed.
The system of measuring should also
be distinguished from the question of
what base-points should be used. I think
that the method of determining this by
arcs of circles was somewhat misunder-

stood in the Anglo-Norwegian argumentation, or at least appeared to be misunderstood. Such a method could be
used no matter which base-point theory
is employed for measuring the starting
place. The question of bays is also
important because, as you will see from
this map, a bay is also an important
factor in some cases in creating inland
waters out of what were formerly high
seas. One significant aspect of the
measurement question lies in its possible
impact on the creation of "inland
waters" out of what was formerly territorial or open sea. If "internal waters"
are thus created, and if the previous law
as to internal waters is uncritically
applied to these new expanded areas,
the scope of the right of innocent
passage will be very seriously affected.
This emphasizes the importance of
critically examining any automatic extension of the previous rules to these
new problem areas. (See Chart 2)
In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
case (which I will summarize briefly),
the chart indicates the area in dispute,
which starts at the Arctic Circle and
goes all the way around to the Norwegian border. The Norwegian claim
enclosed large areas of water hitherto
regarded as high seas. The base line is
this dotted line which marks the boundary of internal waters; the four miles
beyond that are the claimed territorial
waters. This was laid down in a 1935
decree of Norway, with a great deal of
historical argument buttressing it. The
effect of the decision upholding this
system, instead of following the coast
line more closely, is to enclose large
areas of water not merely as territorial
waters but as inland waters as well. Of
course, the effect is to expand tremendously the area of sea generally reserved, including fishing rights, to the
coastal state's exclusive control.
The decision by the International
Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case in 1951 was mainly concerned with the question of the starting
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point for the base lines. For the purposes of that ·case the United Kingdom
did not contest the four-mile breadth
against the three-mile breadth of the
actual territorial belt. The Court emphasized the historical background and the
lack of protest (as they saw it) and
purported to find acquiescence on the
part of other states in this Norwegian
system.
It is important to remember that
while Norway won the case, the WorId
Court made it very clear that base lines,
the extent of the territorial sea, and the
status of waters are all governed by
international law. Even though they
adopted a more flexible approach than
the rather technical rules which were
advocated by the United Kingdom, they
certainly gave no warrant to an interpretation that the coastal state is free to fix
their base lines and the limit of their sea
at will. I do not want to go much
further in this case, except to indicate
that it has also been criticized partly
because the Court gave a good deal of

weight to the so-called "economic
factors," tying them in, however, rather
closely with the alleged unique character of the Norwegian coast.
Although this decision is not technically a precedent, other states have
taken advantage of the decision, so to
speak, as a springboard for an extension
of their claims in a similar manner. This
is part of the practice of states which
must be taken account of in determining the rule of international law on
the subject. Egypt and Yugoslavia have
laws built to some extent on the decisions from the point of view of the
method of measurement. Canada recently announced an important change
of position in the course of a debate in
Parliament, saying that at the next
General Assembly they would urge the
applicability of the Norwegian base-line
system to their coast line, and would
also espouse the twelve-mile limit for
their territorial belt. Other states have
also acted on this decision in varying
ways, but I think it is quite clear that
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there is nothing in the ease which
justifies the 200-mile claim made by
several Latin American States. (See
Chart 3)
One of the states which has acted
upon this, and which was acting upon it
even before the decision came down, is
Iceland. You can see from this chart the
way in which they have also drawn their
lines around the headlands and then
added four miles as their territorial belt.
With regard to the question of the width
of the territorial belt, which was discussed to some extent by previous
speakers, I have already mentioned the
fact that the three-mile rule was historically the rule developed in recent
centuries, so I will not go into further
details. The United Kingdom and the
United States have generally adhered to
this rule and defended it, as having
other leading maritime powers.
On the other hand, there have been
other limits historically advanced in the
Baltic. The Scandinavian States have
usually claimed four miles as the extent
of their territorial sea, while six miles

has been quite a common claim in the
Mediterranean. This map is not particularly drawn for this purpose, but it
suggests what I am going to comment
upon briefly later on: namely, the effect
that an extension of the territorial belt
could well have on maritime interests in
a sea such as the Mediterranean.
Some states have claimed the twelvemile limit. Professor Lissitzyn has discussed the Russian practice, and the fact
that they base their claim now on their
law of 1927. There are certain gaps in
the continuity and extent of their practice in this respect, but they and certain
other states have claimed this limit in
the past and more states are now beginning to claim this limit, I have
already mentioned the intent of Canada.
There are existing laws by Ethiopia
and some other countries which now
explicitly claim the twelve-mile limit.
Turkey, for example, has stated to the
International Law Commission that it
believes twelve miles is the established
limit, although I have seen no official
document which makes that claim. In
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the western Pacific, the fishing zone has
been used in effect to extend territorial
waters, just as they have done in Latin
America. Many of the Latin American
States have, as you know, claimed twohundred-mile limits, including exclusive
exploitation of fisheries, and purportedly based their claims on American
proclamations and the practice of other
states. In some cases they have gone
way beyond any continental shelf which
they may have, and have attempted to
set up a two-hundred-miIe maritime
zone on the basis of continental shelf
precedents. Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Costa
Rica, and many others have made these
claims despite the fact that the United
States and United Kingdom shelf
proclamations expressly deny any claim
to exclusive fisheries and preserve the
right of free navigation over the superjacent waters. (See Chart 4)
This is not as detailed a map of the
western Pacific as I would have liked to
have shown you, but there is the socalled "Rhee Line" set up by Korea,

,,..

f ".J~":~~"
!

u

s

s

and the fishing zone restrictions by the
Russians (which were set out unilaterally at first). There is also a good
deal of evidence that the Philippines
may be attempting to claim sovereignty
over the Sulu Sea and certain other
waters that are so-called "internal seas,"
although this claim has not been formerly incorporated in any instrument.
Very briefly, this problem has been
debated at many international conferences. My fellow professors are
familiar (as are many of you also, I am
sure) with the failure to reach agreement at the 1930 Hague Conference.
There has been a series of conferences
within the Inter-American system in the
past few years. At Rio de Janeiro, in
1953, the Inter-American Juridical
Committee, a subsidiary technical
organ, by a divided vote of four to
three, made some very broad pronouncements with respect to the right
of the coastal state to claim extensive
areas of sea.
More recently, in Mexico City, the
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Inter-Ameriean Couneil of Jurists, a
more authoritative and poliey-making
body, voted fifteen to one to approve
the so-ealled "Declaration of Mexico"
(the one vote being that of the United
States), which, in general terms, pretty
much took the position that the coastal
state is free under international law to
develop extensive sea zones in the protection of its economic and other interests.
Still more recently there was a
specialized conference of the Organization of American States itself at Ciudad
Trujillo, which produced a more
balanced statement on the question. It
indicated tlle differences of opinion and
made clear that there was no agreed
international law upholding these extensive Latin-American claims.
Similarly, the United States has held
conferences with Chile, Ecuador and
Peru in an attempt to resolve our
differences with them on the twohundred-mile claim made by those
countries. Thus far, there has been no
effective result. Those countries rejected
the offer of the United States to refer
their differences to the International
Court of Justice for decision. Such an
attitude is no service to the orderly
development of international law on
this question.
The positions taken in the International Law Commission's Final Report,
previously referred to, will be summarized briefly. In effect, they have said
that the three-mile rule is not a uniform
rule of practice, but that international
law does not permit more than a twelvemile limit They also say, without taking
a decision, that some states claim more
than three miles and ollier states do not
recognize claims for more than this
amount They then suggest that a diplomatic conference be called to handle the
whole problem.
On the question of measurement,
they have attempted to restate the
holding of the Anglo-Norwegian case.
One interesting by-product of that re-

statement is that they have inserted in
Article 5, concerning the "straight base
line system," that wherever the use of
that system creates internal waters out
of areas that were formerly high seas
and which were normally used for international navigation, the right of innocent passage through such waters
should be preserved. With respect to this
last Report, there was no noted dissent
by the representative of the United
States. The United Kingdom, Russian
and Czechoslovak representatives made
reservations to a number of these provisions, however.
On the question of contiguous zones,
I will merely attempt to indicate some
of the areas in which, for various reasons, we have exercised these claimsparticularly in the realm of defensive sea
areas in effect, mostly outside the Continental United States and mostly covering territorial waters only. Like many
other states, we have an effective order
which closes certain ports to foreign
vessels-again, mostly in ports outside
the United States. We established a
closed area in the Marshall Islands for
hydrogen bomb tests. There are still
twenty-four airspace reservations in
effect, both inside and outside of the
country and in many cases overlapping
the defensive sea areas.
The United States has established Air
Defense Identification Zones, as has
Canada (shown on Chart 1). This includes internal air defense identification
zones and coastal air defense identification zones. There was a discussion yesterday of a possible submarine defense
identification zone, which would raise
different considerations as to practicability and legality.
On the question of proving grounds,
I will not deal with the hydrogen bomb
tests. But we have entered into an
extensive series of arrangements concerning proving grounds with the United
Kingdom for setting up test range areas
and providing for interflight-interceptor
practice. These agreements with them
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have gradually been extended, the latest
one going as far as Ascension Island in
the southeastern Atlantic. We have also
made collateral agreements of a similar
character with Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and a rather closely allied
-but not strictly the same-agreement
with Haiti.
In general, these agreements on
proving grounds are elaborate and complex, as are the Status of Armed Forces
Agreements. They cover a wide range of
activities with respect to jurisdiction,
taxation, and the like. But with respect
to the possible question of damage,
these agreements had a specific provision in the basic Agreement of 1950
between the United Kingdom and the
United States, and this same provision
has been repeate,d in the subsequent
agreements to a large extent.
One article, Article 2, paragraph 6,
provides that "both governments agree
to take reasonable precautions to avoid
danger and damage." Article 22 provides that the United States agrees "to
pay adequate compensation not less
than the law of the Bahama Islands
requires, and to idemnify the governments of the United Kingdom and the
Bahama Islands for damage, for death,
or injury to any person in the area
except people employed by the United
Kingdom on the project itsel£" It also
provides for "property damage," for
"acquisition of property," and so on.
One interesting feature is that it provides that the laws in force in the
Bahama Islands are those referred to as
the laws at the time of the signing of the
treaty, unless agreed otherwise.
The International Law Commission,
in their article on the contiguous zones,
did not even- mention defense as one of
the purposes in setting up an exact limit
of twelve miles. I think that the inconsistency of that is clear.
In conclusion, omitting fisheries and
the continental shelf, a brief wo.d may
be in order on the International Law
Commission. As you know, the Com-

mIssIon is composed of so·called "experts," and not governmental representatives. They purport to engage in the
codification and progressive development of international law. In their Final
Report on the Law of the Sea, they
have admitted, at least in that instance,
that it is impossible to differentiate the
provisions with respect to those two
theoretically different objectives. Their
work can either be merely published or
an international conference can be
called as a means of reaching a binding
agreement. It can only be binding on
governments by agreement. But, nevertheless, it is influential; it is an important subject for study; it certainly
has an influence on doctrine and practice, as I have tried to suggest this
morning; and it seems to me that it is
particularly important to naval officers,
not only of the United States but also
of its allies in the Free World.
A brief discussion of the numerous
protests that have been made will indicate the reactions of other claimants as
decisionmakers..The United States and
the United Kingdom have protested
these extensive claims in Latin America
and in other areas of the world.
Similarly, other states have protested to
indicate that they do not acquiesce in
these claims. Many of these protests are
not available for publication, but their
existence is known. Others have been
published. Many of them may be found
in the written proceedings in the AngloNorwegian Fisheries Case.
In concluding, I want very briefly to
suggest that while it may be currently
fashionable in some circles to espouse a
larger limit than three miles, and while
the three-mile rule is certainly on the
defensive, there are certain other considerations that may not have been
given adequate consideration.
In time of peace, certainly fisheries
are probably the element of most importance. With respect to fisheries
alone, there are many equities of the
coastal state which arouse sympathetic
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consideration. In spite of that, any
change from the three-mile rule to the
twelve-mile rule should be given a great
deal more thought than it has thus far
received, and perhaps the security interests involved have not been adequately
developed. A change from three miles to
twelve miles would cut out of the high
seas approximately 3 million square
miles of water, or 2% of the high seas of
the world. According to the Hydrographic Office, only 20% of the lighthouses in the world reach twelve miles
out, and the expense of dealing with
that problem is something to contemplate.
As I have tried to suggest today, it is
not merely t~e extent of the territorial
waters but the effect of these baseline
claims that is of very great importance
for security. The test of reasonablene$S
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case is
a vague formula. If properly interpreted,
it is not an unwise standard. But it poses
the question of the validity of these
more extensive claims. The fact that
there is no compulsory way of resolving
these disputes, although the recording
of protests makes clear the lack of
agreement, accentuates the difficulties
of reaching an equitable and authoritative solution.
With respect to security, we might
also think of the fact that unless international law differentiates more than it
has in many of these rules, a zone for
fishing purposes, which is ardently
desired, means also a zone to patrol for
neutrality purposes in time of war, thus
tripling the patrol area. It would permit
a neutral who is conniving with another
belligerent more easily to disguise the

cooperation. With reference to the submarine, it would make submersion
within territorial waters much easier. I
have already mentioned the effect on
innocent passage. Of course there is also
the important problem of the fact that
it is generally agreed that there is no
right of innocent passage through the
air. The extension of the airspace over
these claimed areas is another serious
problem for air operations. There is also
practically a consideration that the extension of coastal state claims conceivably will hamper the freedom of
navigation throughout the world
through practical restrictions on pilotage, and so forth, as well as through the
lack of adequate lights, which I have
mentioned.
With respect to security, I cannot
develop that aspect further now. But, as
naval officers, I am sure you will realize
the effect of extending from three miles
to twelve miles the territorial claims in
such seas as the Mediterranean, the
Baltic, through the sea passages of the
Philippines, the East China Sea, the Sea
of Japan, and so on. So it should be
borne in mind that it is not only the
interests of the United States which are
at stake and ought to be considered in
this question, but the interests of all the
Free World in the use of naval power to
prevent aggression and to preserve
peace.
It would be sanguine to predict that
there will be agreement in the near
future on these questions. I hope, however, that these brief remarks will perhaps stimulate the staff and students at
the College to give this very important
matter further consideration.
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